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显著高于 CEO，CFO 卖出行为的长期获利能力也高于 CEO，但是这一差异并不显
著。CFO 对公司未来收益具有更强的预测能力。 
从市场反应来看，在 CEO 和 CFO 买入本公司股票的信息披露后，市场的反应
比较积极，卖出行为信息披露后，市场反应消极，但是这些反应在统计上并不显













































The directors, supervisors and senior executives of listed companies are often 
called “insiders”, which often have easier access to the information about the 
company’s state of operation and the future development than the general investors. 
Information is essential for securities transactions. Despite large numbers of empirical 
studies have shown that the insiders usually can have abnormal return in transaction 
because of the advantage of master and taking advantage of the information, however, 
for different positions of insiders (CEOs and CFOs), they are all able to obtain the 
same amount of abnormal return? “Information Hierarchy Hypothesis” and 
“Professional Competence Hypothesis” give different theoretical analysis. The former 
considers that core information- level insiders can obtain greater information 
superiority and get more abnormal return the insider trading, while the latter considers 
that the financial officers with better professional interpretation of useful information 
can have better access to and use of the important financial information for company 
valuation, who have stronger information superiority and get more abnormal return in 
the insider trading. However, the existing literatures have not yet given detailed 
empirical evidence. Based on this, this paper studies the insider trading in Shanghai 
and Shenzhen Stock Exchange, applies Event Study Methodology to compare the 
CEOs’ and CFOs’ abnormal return, takes empirical test on “Information Hierarchy 
Hypothesis” and “Professional Competence Hypothesis” from three angles of 
short-term timing ability, long-term profitability and market reaction. The main 
conclusions of the study are as follows: 
In the short term, the CEOs’ and CFOs’ purchases and sales both have the ability to 
obtain significant abnormal return, which is reflected on their ability to choose the 
timing. They can buy at the low point and sell at the highpoint. CEOs’ purchases have 
better timing ability than CFOs’, while CFO s’ sales have better timing ability than 
CEOs’. But these differences were not statistically significant.  
















abnormal return on buying or selling the company's stock, which is reflected on the 
long-term profitability of their trading behavior with predictive ability of the future 
earnings of the stock. Concretely, the stock’s future abnormal return is significantly 
positive when they buy the stocks of their companies, while the stock’s future 
abnormal return is significantly negative when they sell the stocks. However, the 
absolute size of the abnormal returns decreases with the lengthening of the window 
period. The statistical tests show that the CFOs’ buying behavior’s long-term 
profitability is significantly higher than the CEOs’, the same with the CFOs’ selling 
behavior, but this difference is not significant. CFOs have a stronger ability to predict 
the future earnings of the company. 
From the point of the market reaction, after public disclosures of the CEOs’ and 
CFOs’ purchases, the market reaction is more positive, while the market reaction is 
more negative upon the disclosure of sales. But the reaction is not statistically 
significant. Market reaction to the public disclosures of the CEOs’ purchases and sales 
has no significant difference with the CFOs’. 
 
Key Words : Insider Trading; CEO; CFO; Abnormal Return;  


























第 1 章 绪 论 ..................................................................................... 1 
1.1 问题提出......................................................................................................... 1 
1.2 研究框架......................................................................................................... 3 
1.3 创新之处.......................................................................................................... 4 
第 2 章 文献综述 ............................................................................... 5 
2.1 内部人交易获取超常收益 ............................................................................. 5 
2.2 不同内部人获取超常收益的差异 ................................................................ 6 
2.3 内部人交易传递信息 .................................................................................... 7 
2.4 影响内部人获利的因素 ................................................................................ 7 
第 3 章 研究背景 ............................................................................... 9 
3.1 理论背景.......................................................................................................... 9 
3.2 法律制度背景................................................................................................ 13 
3.3 实际市场背景................................................................................................ 15 
第 4 章 研究假设 ............................................................................. 19 
4.1 CEO 和 CFO 获取超常收益及市场反应 ................................................... 19 
4.2 在内部人交易中 CFO 能否胜过 CEO ....................................................... 20 
第 5 章 研究设计 ............................................................................. 22 
5.1 数据来源和样本选取 ................................................................................... 22 
5.2 事件研究法.................................................................................................... 23 
5.3 短期择机能力衡量 ...................................................................................... 27 
5.4 长期获利能力衡量 ....................................................................................... 28 
5.5 市场反应衡量................................................................................................ 28 
5.6 多元回归模型............................................................................................... 29 
















6.1 CEO 和 CFO 交易短期择机能力 ............................................................... 31 
6.2 CEO 和 CFO 交易长期获利能力 ............................................................... 36 
6.3 市场对 CEO 和 CFO 交易的反应 ............................................................. 40 
6.4 多元回归分析............................................................................................... 44 
6.5 不同因素水平下差异性分析 ...................................................................... 47 
6.6 稳健性检验................................................................................................... 52 
第 7 章 总结与讨论 .......................................................................... 54 
参 考 文 献 ..................................................................................... 57 






























Table of Contents 
Chapter 1 Introduction ...................................................................... 1 
1.1 Problem Introduction ........................................................................................ 2 
1.2 Research Structures ........................................................................................... 3 
1.3 Innovations ......................................................................................................... 4 
Chapter 2 Literature Review ......... .......................................................5 
2.1 Abnormal Return of Insider Trading  ............................................................. 5 
2.2 Difference among Insiders’ Abnormal Return .............................................. 6 
2.3 Insider Trading Delivers Information .............................................................. 7 
2.4 Factors of Abnormal Return ............................................................................. 7 
Chapter 3 Research Background ....................................................... 9 
3.1 Theory Background ........................................................................................... 9 
3.2 Legal System Background ............................................................................... 13 
3.3 Actual Market Background............................................................................. 15 
Chapter 4 Research Hypothesis ....................................................... 19 
4.1 CEOs and CFOs get Abnormal Return and Market Reaction .................... 19 
4.2 Whether CFOs can win the CEOs in Insider Trading.................................... 3 
Chapter 5 Research Design .............................................................. 22 
5.1 Data Source and Sample Selection ................................................................... 4 
5.2 Event Study Methodology ............................................................................... 23 
5.3 Measure of Short-term Timing Ability .......................................................... 27 
5.4 Measure of Long-term Profitability ............................................................... 28 
5.5 Measure of Market Reaction .......................................................................... 29 
5.6 Multiple Regression Model ............................................................................. 29 
Chapter 6 Empirical Analysis ......................................................... 31 
















6.2 Long-term Profitability of CEOs and CFOs ................................................. 36 
6.3 Market Reaction to Public Disclosures of the CEOs’ and CFOs’ Trade..... 40 
6.4 Multiple Regression Analysis .......................................................................... 44 
6.5 Specific Analysis under Different Factor Levels ........................................... 47 
6.6 Robustness Test ................................................................................................ 52 
Chapter 7 Conclusions and Discussions ............................................. 5 

















第 1 章  绪论 
1 
 













而我国的内部人交易正式开始于 2006 年 1 月 1 日新《公司法》的施行，根
据公布在上海证券交易所和深圳证券交易所的网站上的交易记录，从 2006 年 1
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施的 SOX 法案也进一步提高了 CFO 在公司内部的地位，该法案强调了 CFO 与





SOX 法案颁布前，CFO 买入本公司股票获取超常收益的能力就超过了 CEO，CFO
的交易行为包含了更多的信息，这一结果推翻了“信息层级假说”。那么对于我
国 CFO 制度建立尚不完善的上市公司，CFO 是否也能在内部人交易中比 CEO
表现得更好呢？ 










研究 CEO 和 CFO 在交易本公司股票中获取超常收益的差异，可以说明他们
的内部交易行为传递出信息的多少，也为市场监管和投资者利用他们的交易传递
出的价格信号提供参考依据。另外各国 CFO 在上市公司内部的地位不断提升，
我国上市公司的 CFO 也将取得更高的地位，如果在 CFO 信息层级低于 CEO 的
目前市场上 CFO 都能在内部交易中胜过 CEO，那么以后 CFO 地位进一步提升
后其获取超常收益的能力将进一步提升。CFO 就将成为内部人交易监督新重点，


















本文以我国上市公司的CEO 和 CFO 在交易本公司股票中获取超常收益能力
的差异为研究中心，从短期择机能力、长期获利能力和市场反应三个角度分别反
映获取超常收益的能力。全文分为 7 章，论文框架如下： 








第 4 章，研究假设。基于上文的理论背景，首先就 CEO 和 CFO 能否在交易
本公司股票时获取超常收益提出假设，基于这一假设又提出 CFO 能否在内部交





第 6 章，实证研究。本章根据研究设计的思路检验了研究假设在 CEO 和 CFO
买入和卖出中是否成立，对 CEO 和 CFO 交易本公司股票获取超常收益的差异从
短期择机能力、长期获利能力、市场反应三个角度分析，并结合多元回归分析，
进一步考察在不同因素水平下CEO 和 CFO 交易本公司股票获取超常收益的差异。 
第 7 章，总结与讨论。综合分析实证研究结果，总结在不同交易方向、事件


























首先，本文将在研究内部人交易的基础上，分析 CEO 和 CFO 两种处于企业
内部核心职位的内部人在交易中的差异。以往的研究多将 CEO 和 CFO 作为企业
内部最高级的管理层，将其作为一个整体研究其交易行为，而尚未有研究我国股
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另外也有一些针对其他成熟的资本市场的研究，比如 Baesel 和 Stein（1979）对
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